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ABSTRACT 
 
This research proposed to establish a quantitative assessment framework for a 
site selection study of liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving terminal by considering 
both chemical process safety and marine transportation safety. 
The offshore LNG terminal, referred as LNG floating storage unit (FSU) or 
floating storage and re-gasification unit (FSRU), performs well on both building and 
operation processes. The LNG FSRU system is a cost-effective and time efficient 
solution for LNG transferring in the offshore area, and it brings minimal impacts to the 
surrounding environment as well. This paper proposed an evaluation framework for 
LNG FSRU system site selection. The evaluation framework was adopted to process a 
comparison study between two possible locations for LNG offshore FSU/FSRU. This 
research divided the whole process into three, beginning with the LNG Carrier 
navigating in the inbound channel, through the berthing operation and ending with the 
completion of LNG transferring operation. The preferred location is determined by 
simultaneously evaluating navigation safety, berthing safety and LNG transferring safety 
objectives based on the quantitative multi-hierarchy framework multi-attribute decision 
analysis (QMFMADA) method. The maritime safety analysis, including navigational 
process and berthing process, was simulated by LNG ship simulator DMU V-Dragon 
3000A and analyzed by statistical software such as R and JMP. The chemical process 
safety simulation was employed to LNG transferring events such as connection hose 
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rupture, flange failure by the consequence simulation tool Safeti. Two scenarios, i.e., 
worst case scenario and maximum credible scenario, were taken into consideration by 
inputting different data of evaluating parameters. The QMFMADA method transformed 
the evaluation criteria to one comparable unit, risk utility value, to evaluate the different 
alternatives. Based on the final value of the simulation, the preferred location can be 
determined and the mitigation measures were presented accordingly.  
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) liquefied via dehydration, de-heavy hydrocarbons, 
and deacidified. Meanwhile, the volume of LNG is approximately equal to 1/600 of that 
of natural gas [1]. Therefore, the high storage efficiency, low cost, and economical long-
distance transportation are the main advantages of LNG. In addition, LNG can be 
optimized industrial and civil fuel because of its eco-friendliness and high calorific 
value. 
Currently, LNG Carrier (LNGC) is the most common tool for long-distance 
transportation between natural gas plants and traditional LNG terminals. Since the 
technique of floating production, storage, and offloading keeps developing these years, 
many new loading and discharging modes are put into use in the offshore area. The 
typical LNG supply chain starts at the gas exploration plants [2]. LNG is liquefied and 
stored in the export terminal; through the LNGC, LNG can be transferred to import 
terminal to store and to carry out re-gasification process before it is sent to downstream 
customers for civil or industrial utilizations. A floating LNG unit can substitute the 
traditional export terminal, acting as a liquefaction plant and LNG storage offshore, this 
is called floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG). On the other side, to take the place of a 
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traditional import LNG terminal, a technology called LNG floating storage and re-
gasification unit (FSRU) was adopted to store the transferred LNG and to convert the 
LNG to gaseous state to meet the requirements of civil and industry utilization [3].   
 
1.2 LNG FSRU 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the typical LNG supply chain includes gas exploration, 
export terminal, LNG carrier, import terminal and pipelines. LNG FSRU, which is 
employed to improve working efficiency of LNG import terminal, integrates the storage 
function with re-gasification plant, locating in the offshore or near shore areas.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. LNG Supply Chain (Adapted from [4]) 
 
 
 
Compared with traditional LNG receiving terminals, LNG-FSRU performs better 
on many aspects. Building time saving: an LNG-FSRU  is typically commissioned in 2 
years, while an onshore LNG terminal usually takes 4-5 years; Flexible to re-location: 
typical LNG-FSRU systems are reconfigured by LNGCs, and since they still can serve 
as a transportation tool, when the natural gas market grows, it can be relocated in another 
area to solve supply and demand problems like the emergent shortage of natural gas; 
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Cost-effective, the investment of LNG-FSRU is usually 4 to 5 times less than that of 
land LNG receiving terminal [5]. 
 
1.3 Research Objective 
 
This research defines a LNG FSRU system, including the LNG carrier (LNGC) 
which is to be berthed alongside the FSRU, the FSRU itself and the operation interaction 
of LNGC and FSRU. It starts from the LNGC entering into the inner harbor area via 
inbound channel and ends with the completion of LNG transferring. Three events are 
involved in the research, LNGC navigation, LNGC berthing alongside the LNG FSRU 
and cargo transferring operation between LNGC and LNG FSRU.  
The research objective is to perform an offshore facility, LNG FSRU, siting 
evaluation by integrating both maritime safety and chemical process safety knowledge. 
To fulfill it, the safety performance evaluation framework of the LNG FSRU system 
should be established by risk evaluation methods, and this framework is formulated to 
make a decision on the location of two alternatives as a case study. To build the safety 
evaluation framework, one improved multi-attribute decision analysis (MADA) is 
adopted to assess the different hierarchies layer by layer from bottom to top. 
Furthermore, the weight vectors and utility values should be determined by calculation. 
The final decision can be made by analyzing the output of total utility values of the 
different alternatives accordingly. 
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The evaluation process starts with the LNGC entering the inner harbor channel, 
after the LNGC berthing alongside FSRU and ends with the completion of LNG cargo 
transferring, see Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Defined Evaluation Processes 
 
 
 
Three processes are comprised in this research: 
• Navigational Safety: LNGC Navigating in the inner harbor channel; 
• Berthing Safety: LNGC Berthing operation in the turning basin area; 
• Operational Safety: LNG offloading process from LNGC to LNG FSRU. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The Multi-attribute decision analysis (MADA) was employed to obtain the 
preferred decision of building one LNG FSRU system. MADA is an optimum decision-
making method to get the output of overall utility function, which is constituted by 
weight vectors multiplied by utility values. Based on the calculated overall utility value 
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of each alternative, the preferred decision can be made with the maximum expected 
utility value [6].  
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was firstly proposed by Dr. Saaty in the 1970s 
to solve decision making problems by evaluating different factors from bottom hierarchy 
to the highest one [7].  
Since the MADA is good at dealing with the decision-making problems among 
several attributes in one layer, and the AHP outperforms for different layer 
determination. By putting use of these two theories, this research improved MADA and 
AHP to a quantitative multi-hierarchy framework MADA (QMFMADA). The core idea 
of this method to divide the top problem into several processes first, then different 
processes are evaluated individually by various quantitative tools such as risk simulation 
software such as Safeti, ship simulator and data analysis software R. Next step is for 
hazard identification: major hazards are identified under different processes. To 
quantitatively evaluate different hazards, previous theories and equations may be 
referred to determine the major attributes which are under the hazard layer. By 
considering the data availability, the attribute layers can still go down to sub factor 
layers to quantitatively evaluate the top object directly. Put simply, the framework 
determination of QMFMADA is a top-to-bottom work, and then the final evaluation is a 
bottom-to-top progress, see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Proposed Evaluation Framework of QMFMADA 
 
 
 
  
Objective 
Process 1
Hazard 1 
Attribute 1
…
… Process N
… Hazard N
Attribute N… … …
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CHAPTER II 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Hazard Identification 
 
To establish the framework shown in Figure 3, it is necessary to determine the 
hazard hierarchy after the process layer has been defined in Figure 2. Generally, hazards 
are identified by hazard and operability study (HAZOP), Failure mode, effects and 
criticality analysis (FMECA), and What-if analysis. According to Paltrinieri, 2015, the 
typical hazards identified for an LNG-FSRU system are: contact with cryogenic liquid, 
pool fire, flash fire, rapid phase transition (RPT), stranding, contacting with other objects 
in the vicinity, and leaking during cargo transferring [8]. 
During 1964 to 2015, there are 162 LNGC accidents* [39], see Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. LNGC Accident Category Distribution 
*Sources from Houston Law Center, IZAR, Colton Company, DNV report: LNG Accident review and 
www.seasearcher.com 
 
 
 
To establish the LNG-FSRU location evaluation criteria, several factors, such as 
hydrographic information, navigation safety, fire and explosive risks, exclusion areas, 
and environment sensitivity, should be taken into consideration individually. Combined 
with previously recorded incidents, the most threaten hazards, collision, stranding, 
fire/explosion, and spillage during cargo handling, are selected as evaluation factors of 
hazard layer in the QMFMADA framework.  
From Woodward et al. 2010, the potential fatalities from LNGC operations were 
estimated as shown in following table.  
 
 
 
 
Bosterious 
Weather, 9
Loading/unloadin
g Events, 22
Fire/Explosion, 10
Contact, 8
Grounding, 9
Collision, 21
Equipment 
Failure, 56
Cargo 
Containment 
System Failure, 27
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 Table 1. Potential Fatalities for Major LNGC Accident Categories by Woodward 2010 [9] 
Accident Category  Potential Fatalities per Year  
Collision  4.42*10-3  
Grounding  2.93*10-3  
Contact  1.46*10-3  
Fire & Explosion  6.72*10-4  
Loading/Unloading Events  2.64*10-4  
 
 
 
From Table 1, the collision and grounding are the two most severe accidents for 
LNGC navigation at sea and the contacting usually happened in the harbor areas, leading 
to third potential fatalities among all accidents. In addition, fire/explosion and loading 
events should be taken more attention during LNG transferring from LNG carrier to 
LNG terminal. Therefore, the three processes should be evaluated individually in a 
quantitative way.  
 
2.2 LNGC Navigational Process 
 
Based on previous research experience, cargo release, collision and grounding 
are usually considered as major consequences of site specific risk assessment in nautical 
safety study. As above table mentioned, collision and grounding are selected as the 
major hazards for LNGC navigation safety phase.   
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2.2.1 Collision Model 
Fujii’s Model 
Researcher Fujii proposed a model to calculate the average number of evasive 
actions (e.a.) by one ship navigating in one area. Fujii’s Model is [10]: 
No. (e. a. ) = ∫ (ρDeVrel/V)
exit
entrance
dx                                        (1) 
ρ: Traffic density, number of ships per unit area 
De: Diameter of collision avoidance  
V: Speed of passing vessel  
Vrel: Relative speed 
The value of De varies from 9.5 to 16.3 times of ship length, which made the 
collision avoidance quite conservative since the minimum shipping distance in some 
narrow straits are around 3 times of ship’ length overall in the real world. 
 
Macduff’s Model 
Another researcher, Macduff, firstly proposed the probable collision model, and 
the formula is [11]: 
P = Pg ∗ Pc                                                                 (2) 
Where 
-P: the probability that a vessel is involved in a collision accident during its 
voyage passing one assigned water area 
-Pg: the geometrical probability, collision probability without aversive measures 
are made.  
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-Pc: the causation probability, the conditional probability that a collision occurs 
in an accidental scenario.  
Pg is relevant to geometric parameters of water area, vessel size, traffic volume, 
course and speed; while Pg is related to mariner’s skills, vessel maneuverability under 
accident scenarios, and many literatures considered it as a constant. Then for geometrical 
probability Pg, Macduff’s Model estimated it as follows [11]. 
Pg =  
X∙L
D2
∙
Sin(θ 2⁄ )
925
                                                            (3) 
Where 
-D: Average distance between ships 
-X: Actual length of path for one ship 
-L: Average vessel length 
-V: Ship’s approaching speed, two ships are assumed equal 
-θ: The angle that one single ship approaching the channel with  
The value of Pg will be overestimated when θ is small. The assumption of two 
ships’ speed being equal made the Pg underestimated. 
 
Pedersen’s Model 
            To determine the geometrical probability Pg, Pedersen and his research fellows 
presented a model under a two-channel situation. Channel 1 and channel 2 are assumed 
as two crossing channels. The equation 4 shows the Pedersen’s collision model [12]. 
P∆t =
Qj
(2)
Vj
(2) fj
2(zj)DijVijdzj∆t                                                  (4) 
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-Qj: Number of movements of ship class j per unit time, named as traffic volume 
-Z: Distance from the centerline of the fairway 
-f: Lateral distribution of the ship routes, often normal distribution 
-Vij: Relative velocity; -Di, Collision diameter  
This model is reasonable for crossing scenario to estimate the geometrical 
probability due to a more practical assumption. However, the lack of ship movement 
data made it difficult to determine the probability distribution of ship motion. 
In summary, Table 2 shows the expressions and characteristics of each model.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of Ship Collision Model 
Model  Expression Drawbacks  
Fujii’s 
Model 
No. = ∫ (ρDeVrel /V)
exit
entrance
dx 
 
De is conservative (9.5 to 16.3 times ship length), so Pg 
is overestimated. 
Macduff’s 
Model  Pg =  
X ∙ L
D2
∙
Sin(θ 2⁄ )
925
 
 
Pg is overestimated when ɵ is small and 
underestimated because of the assumption of two ships 
are equal speed.  
Pedersen’s 
Model P∆t =
Qj
(2)
Vj
(2)
fj
2(zj)DijVijdzj∆t 
 
Applicable for crossing channel situation, assume ship 
lateral motion as normal distribution, not very accurate 
for head on situation 
 
 
 
COWI Model 
In order to precisely simulate the head on situation (See Figure 5) in real world, 
the COWI model is applied to calculate ship collision probability [13]. 
Px = Pt × Pg × Pc × kRR = LN1N2 |
V1−V2
V1V2
| × (
B1+B2
c
) × (3 × 10−4) × kRR         (5) 
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L: length of route segment 
N1, N2: Number of ship 1, 2 passing per year 
V1, V2: Speed of Ship 1 and Ship 2 
B1, B2: Breadth of Ship 1 and Ship 2  
Pc: Causation probability, taken as a constant 3 × 10−4 
kRR: Risk reduction factor, usually taken 0.5 [13] 
 
 
Figure 5. Head-on Collision Situation for Two Ships by Li et al., 2012 (Adapted from [13]) 
 
 
 
As shown in above figure, the overlap area was deemed as the possible collision 
area with the presupposition of ships’ motion following normal distribution. Compared 
to other models, the COWI model considered the risk mitigation measure and reduced 
the uncertainty in some extent by assuming ship motion as normal distribution. 
Moreover, the most likelihood situation for LNGC navigation in inbound channel is head 
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on situation, so the COWI model was adopted to carry out simulation for LNGC 
navigation safety phase. It is widely accepted that visibility is a key factor to influence 
coastal navigation and the leeway and drift angle, which was deemed as a significant 
parameter to show the vessel’s maneuverability, was largely dependent on the magnitude 
of wind and current. Therefore, the main parameters to evaluate the collision hazard are 
determined as wind, visibility and the probability of following current.  
 
2.2.2 Grounding Model 
LNGC may suffer from grounding or standing risk when it navigates without 
sufficient water depth and this risk may bring severe consequence if the sediment of the 
grounding place is considerably solid. In practice, deck officers should check the water 
depth reading frequently to make sure the ship has no chance to rush into the shoal when 
the ship is navigating in harbor areas. The following models are common ones to 
simulate ship’s grounding. 
Fujii’s Model 
Similarly, the concepts of geometrical and causation probability were brought to 
estimate likelihood of grounding as well. Fujii proposed the expected number of 
groundings (Ng), shown in Equation 6 [10]. 
NG = PCDρV                                                             (6) 
Where  
-Pc: Causation Probability 
-V: Ship’s speed 
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-ρ: Traffic Density 
-D: The width of shoal 
Macduff’s Model 
Meanwhile, Macduff adopted Buffon’s needle problem to estimate Pg, the 
equation 7 shows the relationship among Pg, channel width and stopping distance of 
ships [11]. 
PG =
4T
πC
                                                                  (7) 
-C: The width of the channel 
-T: The ship’s stopping distance 
These two above-mentioned models are only affected by the ship particulars and 
other elements related to location are set to be constant. The uncertainties of the real 
navigation situation are ignored in most cases, and this model merely considered 
historical accident data. But this model has been widely used as a basis to improve 
grounding model. 
Pedersen and Simonsen’s Model 
Pedersen and Simonsen developed their model to estimate the expected annual 
number of groundings (Ng), see equation 8 [14]. 
NG = ∑ PC,iQie
−d/ain class
Ship class i ∫ fi(z)dz
Zmax
Zmin
                                 (8) 
Where  
-Pc: Causation probability 
-Q: number of transshipment per year 
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-a: the average time interval of position checks by deck officers 
-d: the width of channel 
-f(): the actual traffic distribution of ships  
-z: the transverse coordinates of shoals  
Table 3 serves a review of above mentioned grounding models, illustrating their 
expressions and drawbacks. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of Ship Grounding Model 
Model  Expression Drawbacks  
Fujii’s Model NG = PCDρV 
 
Human factors, ship’s maneuverability and 
environmental aspects were all neglected.  
 
Macduff’s 
Model  PG =
4T
πC
 
 
Causation probabilities are unknown; this model 
cannot recommend any risk control option. Traffic 
density is assumed uniformly.  
 
Pedersen and 
Simonsen’s 
model 
 
∑ PC,iQie
−d/ai
n class
Ship class i
∫ fi(z)dz
Zmax
Zmin
 
 
Human factors and ship maneuverability are still 
neglected and effect of traffic (Q) and ship class 
(i) are not evidence based.  
 
 
 
            Montewka’s Model 
To overcome those above-mentioned drawbacks, Montewka et al. [15] have 
proposed a more accurate grounding model with the consideration of the 
maneuverability of an individual ship and the properties of the traffic. In addition, 
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Automatic Information System was employed to determine the distribution of the ship’s 
motion. 
 
F = M ×
UKC
H×r
=
R×b
d×s×c
×
UKC
H×r
                                           (9) 
      -F: threatened Level  
      -R: radius of Turning Circle  
      -b: a coefficient that represents the extent of damage to a ship’s hull that 
occurs when the ship runs aground  
      -d: a coefficient that represents the distance at which a hazard can be detected  
      -s: a coefficient that represents the accuracy of depth soundings  
      -c: a coefficient that represents positional accuracy 
      -UKC: under keel clearance 
      -H: depth of the channel 
      -1/r: distance decay curve  
For the LNGC navigation process, the Montewka’s Model was selected as the 
one to simulate stranding situations since it has a better interpretation and has considered 
ship maneuverability. Based on the equation 9, the main parameters selected for 
grounding hazard of navigational process are channel width, channel curvature and 
under keel clearance. 
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2.3 Berthing Process 
 
When berthing or unberthing operation is taking place, the LNGC shows a 
characteristic of low speed and large drift angle [16]. Typically, berthing operation for 
large ships should consider factors such as temperature, berthing ability, wind force, 
visibility and thunderstorm [17], another researcher Bai presented the berthing influence 
factors as tug assistance, wind, current, longitudinal speed control, transverse speed 
control and angular velocity control [18]. What is more, poor communication between 
crew and marine pilots during berthing operation will probably lead to marine disasters 
near ports, and the language and cultural diversity of seafarers needs to be considered as 
well [19]. 
To evaluate this complicated operation process in a quantitative way, Yang 
proposed a berthing model by presenting models of ship, propeller and rudder 
individually and he took full considerations of interactions between each part. As shown 
in Figure 6, Yang set up two coordinate systems, one is fixed coordinate X0Y0, and the 
other is ship moving coordinate system xGy [16].  
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           Figure 6. Two Coordinate System of LNGC by Yansheng, 1996 (Adapted from [16]) 
 
 
Where 
-m, -mx, -my: ship mass, added mass along x axis, added mass along y axis 
-u, -v: line velocity components 
-r: heading angular velocity 
-Izz: inertia moment  
-Jzz: added inertia moment 
-X, -Y: external force along X and Y axis 
-N: moment of external force 
-H: ship hull; -P: propeller; -R: rudder; -A: wind; -L: mooring line; -C: anchor; -
S: bank wall; -T: tug.  
Based on the above-mentioned theory, LNG ship simulator DMU V-Dragon 
3000A was employed to perform a high-precise simulation for LNGC berthing. This 
simulator adopted a six -freedom motion mathematical model and integrated wind 
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disturbing force model (Equ. 10, 11, 12) and wave force model (Equ. 13, 14, 15) as the 
key ones for external force [20].  
Wave Disturbance Model  
XA =
1
2
ρAAfUR
2CXa(αR)                                             (10) 
YA =
1
2
ρAAsUR
2CYa(αR)                                             (11) 
NA =
1
2
ρAAsLoaUR
2CNa(αR)                                      (12) 
-Cxa(αR), -Cya(αR), -Cna(αR): wind pressure coefficients 
-As: Lateral projection area at waterline 
-Af: Conformal projection area at waterline 
            Secondary Order Wave Force Model  
XW2 =
1
2
ρLa2 cos(χ) CXW(λ)                                      (13) 
YW2 =
1
2
ρLa2 sin(χ) CYW(λ)                                       (14) 
NW2 =
1
2
ρL2a2 sin(χ) CNW(λ)                                    (15) 
Where 
-Cxw(λ), -Cyw(λ), -Cnw(λ): experiment coefficients 
-a: wave amplitude 
-χ: wave direction angle 
-λ: wave length  
To evaluate the LNGC berthing operation, six main parameters were determined 
by the equations 10-15, they are : water depth of turning basin, following current speed, 
 21 
 
 
berth length, radius of turning area, transverse wave height and the probability of 
crossing wind (beam wind). 
 
2.4 LNG Transferring Process 
 
After the berthing process is completed, the LNG should be transferred from 
LNGC to LNG FSRU, which is a typical Ship to Ship LNG transferring process. Two 
common solutions for Ship to Ship transferring process, one is called side-by-side 
transferring pattern, and the other is called tandem transferring pattern [21]. There are 
three liquid transferring connection hoses and one vapor counterflow connection hose in 
the Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Ship to Ship Pattern for LNG FSRU System 
 
 
 
Besides the preparation work prior to transferring operation, the typical STS 
process should include: mooring to the FSRU, water curtain switch on, connecting 
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transferring hose, inerting of LNG fuel hose and transferring arm, cool down transferring 
hose,  oxygen test, leak test, Emergency Shut Down System (ESDS) test under normal 
and low temperature, leakage and temperature monitoring during transferring, and post 
processing actions such as draining, methane purging for liquid line and vapor line, 
measurement after transfer and transferring hose disconnection [22].  
For the LNG FSRU system, many causes would result in LNG accidental release 
such as FSRU or LNGC tank breach, connection pipe rupture and LNG vaporizer failure. 
Furthermore, possible associated consequences of LNGC release on water have been 
identified as BLEVE, vapor cloud explosion (VCE), jet fire, flash fire, pool fire, RPT, 
cryogenic burns, etc. Figure 8 shows a simplified bow-tie diagram for LNG accidental 
release to consider both the causes and the outputs of the top event [5, 9, 23].   
 
 
 
Figure 8. Bow-tie Diagram for LNG Accidental Release 
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As shown in above bow-tie diagram, five causes may result in LNG accidental 
release for the LNG FSRU system: FSRU storage tank breach, connection hose rupture, 
connection flange failure, LNG Tank breach and LNG vaporizer failure. To simulate the 
most probable leading factors of LNG transferring process, two events, connection hose 
rupture and connection flange failure, were identified as a result of their high-risk 
characteristic. During LNG transferring process, the accidental release of LNG could 
lead to many possible consequences. When LNG is released under the waterline, it may 
probably convert to vapor bubble, then LNG bubble may escape above the waterline to 
produce LNG vapor. For above-waterline release, jet fire, flash fire and pool fire may 
form under different scenarios. The following figure is the event tree analysis for LNG 
accidental release [9, 24, 25, 31]. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 9. Event Tree Analysis for LNG Release 
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As above mentioned, events of connection hose rupture and connection flange 
failure were identified to list on the hazard layer of the final framework. In addition, as 
shown in Figure 9, the possible fatality related consequences are flash fire, pool fire and 
jet fire, since the explosion is not likely to occur in the open water area [26, 31].   
After the two events and relevant consequences were identified, the dispersion 
models and the fire models were needed to process flammable calculations. The 
flammable calculations include fireballs (instantaneous releases), jet fires (pressurized 
releases), pool fires (after rainout), and vapor cloud fires or explosion. This study 
adopted the Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) as the core model to research the 
dispersion effects of LNG releasing on water, which is also widely applied in the hazard 
assessment software package Phast and Safeti [42]. 
 
2.4.1 Dispersion model 
In this research, crosswind situation was selected as a risk-seeking scenario to 
evaluate the LNG FSRU system. To simulate crosswind situation, three consecutive 
phases were adopted for two scenarios which were instantaneous release and continuous 
release. 
Phase 1, Jet Spreading 
The cloud is assumed to remain circular until the passive transition or until the 
spread rate reduces to the heavy-gas spread rate, [42] 
𝑅𝑦 = 𝑅𝑧                                                            (16) 
Where  
-Ry and -Rz are the ellipse semi-axes. 
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Phase 2, Heavy-gas Spreading 
After the jet spreading phase, the heavy-gas spreading phase served as the second 
one. 
For instantaneous dispersion, 
𝑑 𝑅𝑦
𝑑𝑡
=  
𝐶𝐸
𝐶𝑚
√
𝑔{max[0,𝜌𝑐𝑙𝑑− 𝜌𝑎(𝑧=𝑧𝑐𝑙𝑑)]}𝐻𝑒𝑓𝑓(1+ℎ𝑑)
𝜌𝑐𝑙𝑑
 , 𝐶𝑚 = [Γ (1 +
2
𝑚
)]
1
2⁄        (17) 
For continuous dispersion, 
𝑑 𝑅𝑦
𝑑𝑥
=  
𝐶𝐸
𝑢𝑥𝐶𝑚
√
𝑔{max[0,𝜌𝑐𝑙𝑑− 𝜌𝑎(𝑧=𝑧𝑐𝑙𝑑)]}𝐻𝑒𝑓𝑓(1+ℎ𝑑)
𝜌𝑐𝑙𝑑
 , 𝐶𝑚 = Γ (1 +
1
𝑚
)           (18) 
Where  
-Cm = 1.15, Van Ulden cross-wind spreading parameter 
-Heff: effective height of cloud after full touchdown 
-hd: fraction of bottom half of cloud which is above ground 
-Cm: conversion factor between cloud half-widths 
-CE: parameter in gravity-spreading law 
-m: exponent of horizontal distribution function for concentration 
-ρa: density of ambient air 
- ρcld: density of plume 
-ux: horizontal component of cloud speed 
-z: vertical height above ground 
-zcld: height above ground of cloud centerline 
Phase 3, Passive Spreading 
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After the jet spreading and heavy-gas spreading, the passive spreading was 
applied, and the equations are as follows [42]. 
𝑑 𝑅𝑦
𝑑𝑡
[𝑎𝑡 𝑥] =  𝑢𝑥√2
𝑑 𝜎𝑦𝑎
𝑑𝑥
[𝑎𝑡 𝑥 − 𝑥0]   instantaneous                        (19) 
𝑑 𝑅𝑦
𝑑𝑥
[𝑎𝑡 𝑥] =  √2
𝑑 𝜎𝑦𝑎
𝑑𝑥
[𝑎𝑡 𝑥 − 𝑥0]   continuous                           (20) 
Where  
-x: horizontal downwind distance 
-σya: standard empirical correlation for passive crosswind dispersion coefficient 
 
2.4.2 Fire Model 
Typically, there are three types of fires related to LNG spillage on the water, jet 
fire, pool fire and flash fire.  
The jet fire in this research was produced by a liquefied/ two phase natural gas. 
The effective source diameter of the flame is significant to correctly simulate the effect 
zone of jet fire. The following equation is the expression of effective source diameter 
(Ds) [55]. 
𝐷𝑠 = 2𝑟𝑗√
𝜌𝑗
𝜌𝑣𝑎𝑝[𝑇𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑃𝑜)]
                                                         (21) 
Where  
-rj: expanded radius of the escaping fluid 
-Po: atmospheric pressure 
- ρvap[Tsat(Po)]: the saturated vapor density of the fuel at ambient pressure 
- ρj: Density of expanded fluid jet 
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Besides jet fire, pool fire is another possible fire type when releasing on the 
water. To determine the magnitude of the surface emissive power of pool fire, the 
following equation is adopted [56]. 
𝐸𝑓 =  𝐸𝑚 [1 − 𝑒
−
𝐷
𝐿𝑠] (𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑢𝑠 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠) =  𝐸𝑚 [𝑒
−
𝐷
𝐿𝑠] + 𝐸𝑠 [1 −
 𝑒
−
𝐷
𝐿𝑠] (Sooty Fires) =  
𝜒𝑅𝑚Δ𝐻𝑐
[1+4
𝐻
𝐷
]
 (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠)                   (22) 
Where, 
-Em: Maximum emissive power for luminous fires 
-Es: Smoke emissive power 
-Ls: A characteristic length for decay of surface emissive power 
-χR: The ratio of the total energy radiated to the total energy released 
-D: Diameter of the flame 
-H: Height of the flame 
The equation for “general fires” was applied when the experimental data were 
not available. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
To establish the evaluation framework as shown in Figure 1, the layers should be 
determined from top to bottom. The second layer is filled with three processes defined in 
chapter I: LNGC Navigation Process, Berthing Process and LNG Transferring Process. 
Then the third layer, identified hazard layer, was determined by chapter II.  
 
3.1 Framework Development 
 
 
For the navigational process, collision and grounding are the major hazards for 
LNGC, and from Equation 5, visibility, wind and current are the attributes to lead to 
collision. Similarly, the major parameters in Equation 9, i.e., UKC, Channel Width and 
Channel Curvature, are the attributes to result in LNGC aground.  
For berthing process, DMU ship simulator was adopted to analyze the attributes. 
The extreme conditions were selected as the input parameters: the wind direction was 
blowing to the shore, North; the radius of turning area was set as 500 meter and 1000 
meter, respectively; the berthing length was set 1.2 times and 2 times ship’s length 
overall; and other values of parameters were obtained when the incident happened. Two 
scenarios were designed to determine the most influential factors:  
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1. Full loaded, port side berthing with spring tidal current; 
2. Full loaded, starboard side berthing with ebbing tidal current. 
The failure simulation runs were shown in Table 4.The major consequences of 
berthing process were contacting with obstruction and collision with the FSRU, the 
offshore “pier”.  
 
 
Table 4. Simulation Results of Ship Simulator for Berthing Process 
 
Number 
of runs 
Wind 
Current 
 
Radius of 
Turning 
Area 
Water 
Depth 
Transverse 
Wave Height 
Berth 
Length 
Consequence 
1 N-6 
Spring,  
0.6m/s 
500m 20m 0.7m 2L 
Contacting the 
FSRU 
2 N-6 
Spring, 
1.5m/s 
1000m 21m 0.8m 2L 
Contacting the 
jetty nearby 
3 N-8 
Spring, 
0.8m/s 
1000m 21m 1.0m 2L 
Contacting the 
FSRU, tugs 
malfunction 
4 N-6 
Spring, 
0.6m/s 
1000m 19m 1.5m 2L 
Contacting the 
berthing ship 
nearby 
5 N-8 
Ebb, 
0.9m/s 
1000m 20m 0.8m 2L 
Contacting the 
FSRU, tugs 
malfunction 
6 N-7 
Ebb, 
0.7m/s 
1000m 15m 0.8m 2L 
Contacting 
with the berth 
nearby 
7 N-6 
Ebb, 
0.6m/s 
1000m 20m 0.7m 1.2L 
Contacting 
with FSRU, 
failed to get 
alongside the 
berth 
8 N-6 
Spring, 
0.6m/s 
1000m 20m 0.8m 1.2L 
Contacting 
with FSRU, 
failed to get 
alongside the 
berth 
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Based on the simulation results by DMU V-Dragon 3000A ship simulator, the 
most significant parameters leading to LNGC contacting with the nearest obstruction are 
water depth in that area, transverse wave height of turning area and the magnitude of 
following current; while the attributes for contacting between LNGC and LNG FSRU 
are berth length, radius of turning basin area and the probability of crossing wind.  
For LNG transferring process, vapor cloud, pool fire, flash fire and jet fire may 
be the outputs of the connection flange failure and connection hose failure. Therefore, 
the final framework of QMFMADA is established accordingly, see Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. LNG FSRU System Evaluation Framework of QMFMADA 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 
3.2 Parameters Determination 
 
After the final framework was determined by adopting a top-to-bottom strategy, 
the evaluation work can be processed from an adverse way, attribute layer goes first. In 
this study, the whole LNG FSRU system comprised one LNG carrier, one LNG floating 
receiving terminal and the interact operation between them. So, the characteristics of 
LNGC and LNG FSRU should be determined as a preparation work. Recent years, two 
most common large-scale LNG ship type, Q-Flex and Q-Max, were widely used all over 
world for LNG long distance transiting. To consider the current trend for LNG offshore 
application, Q-Flex was applied in this study as the input ship type of ship simulator 
DMU V-Dragon 3000A, and the dimension of its receiving terminal FSRU was 
employed accordingly [27], see Table 5. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Parameters of LNGC and FSRU 
Parameters  LNGC(Q-Flex)  FSRU  
LOA  303  315  
Loading Capacity  142933.7 m3  217000 m3  
Breadth  50  50  
Draft  12  12.5  
 
 
Referred from the previous reports, the loading / unloading equipment of FSRU 
have 4 liquid loading hoses and 2 vapor return hoses, each of them has one spare part. 
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The maximum loading capacity, length of LNG loading hoses and other parameters are 
listed in Table 6 [28]. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Parameters of FSRU’s Loading Equipment [28] 
Parameter  Value  
Maximum Loading Capacity  8000 m3/h for all loading hoses  
Maximum Unloading Capacity  5000 m3/h for all loading hoses  
Number of LNG Loading Hoses  4 (1 spare)  
Number of Vapor Return Hoses  2 (1 spare)  
Inner Diameter of LNG Loading Hoses  0.254 m  
Length for LNG Loading Hoses  18.5 m  
Inner Diameter of LNG Loading Hose Flange  0.41 m  
Inner Diameter of Vapor Return Hose Flange  0.41 m  
 
 
As shown in Table 6, the value of maximum loading capacity will be applied to 
determine the estimated release volume and the diameter of LNG loading hoses and 
loading hose flange were utilized as the key factors to define scenarios for consequence 
analysis in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDY FOR DEFINED SYSTEM 
 
To find out a favorable position to build LNG FSRU system, two locations from 
China were applied to carry out case study based on the proposed framework. One 
location is New Port of Dalian, northern part of China; the second one is Qidong Port of 
Nantong, the East China Sea, shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
           Figure 11. Two Alternative Locations for LNG FSRU System 
 
 
 
The proposed LNG FSRU layout maps of two locations were drawn in Figure 12. 
The proposed LNG FSRU for Dalian locates at the south edge of the coast line while the 
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proposed one for Nantong locates at the northeast side of the coast line. The harbor 
layout maps of two locations were shown in Figure 12 by Google Map.  
 
 
 
Figure 12. Harbor Layout Maps for Two Alternative Locations  
 
 
 
The yellow arrows in Figure 12 showed the exact positions for the LNG FSRU. 
The proposed direction of location A is 053°～233°, berth length is 446 meters (m); the 
design direction of location B is 099°～279° and berth length is 430 m. Figure 13 
showed the parametric design for two locations by Auto CAD. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. LNG FSRU Layout Maps of Two Locations 
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After the dimension of two proposed locations were determined, the evaluation 
steps can be processed from LNGC navigating in the inbound channel to the LNG 
successfully transferring from LNGC to LNG FSRU. 
 
4.1 Data Collection for Navigational Process 
 
The left side figure is the layout map of location A (Dalian proposed LNG 
FSRU), while the right one is the layout map of location B (Nantong proposed LNG 
FSRU). To evaluate the framework of QMFMADA, the bottom-to-top sequence should 
be adopted, so the factors of very bottom attribute layer for navigation process are 
visibility, wind and current.  
Considering the data availability for attributes of collision hazard, the visibility 
parameter is determined by number of days under poor visibility (visible distance < 
4000m) per year; the wind parameter is determined by Number of days under standard 
wind scale, which is equal to number of days under Beaufort scale 6 and 7 plus 1.5 times 
number of days under Beaufort scale 8 or more [29]; and the parameter current is 
determined by the probability of following current, which is the most difficult situation 
for ship maneuvering. For grounding hazard, the attribute channel width and channel 
curvature can be determined directly by the actual channel data, and the minimum under 
keel clearance (UKC) is equal to the minimum chart water depth minus actual draft of 
LNGC. The actual values of navigation process related attributes for two alternatives are 
shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Values of Navigational Process Related Attributes for Two Locations 
 Channel 
Width  
Channel 
Curvature  
UKC  Windy 
Days  
Following 
Current 
Prob.  
Visibility  
Location A  1050m 31°  12m  140  7.6%  22  
Location B  690 m 27°  5m  151  9.3%  30  
 
 
Referred from the Code for Design of Liquefied Natural Gas Port and Jetty [30], 
the limited conditions for ship’s navigating in channel were regulated as follows. 
Wind speed should not exceed 20m/s and the transverse waves should be less 
than 2.0 meters, while the magnitude of following waves should not exceed 3.0 m; 
Visibility for LNGC navigating in the inbound channel should be greater than 2000 
meters and the upper limit for transverse speed of current is 1.5 m/s, while the following 
current speed should not exceed 2.5 m/s. 
 
4.2 Data Collection for Berthing Process 
 
For the second process, berthing process simulation, the water depth for the 
contacting possibility for LNGC and other navigation obstruction is the minimum water 
depth in berthing area; “Following Current” is the magnitude of following current during 
berthing operation; while the transverse wave height can be directly obtained from the 
hydrographic data of two harbor authorities. For the hazard of possible collision with 
FSRU, the berth length and turning basin area is the values of designed berth length and 
radius of turning water shown in Figure 12, and the crossing wind, which is defined as 
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the wind blowing the LNGC toward FSRU side, was evaluated by the wind rose maps of 
two locations. Therefore, the values of berthing process related attributes are shown in 
Table 8. 
 
 
Table 8. Values of Berthing Process Related Attributes for Two Locations 
 Water 
Depth  
Following 
Current  
Wave 
Height  
Berth 
Length  
Radius of 
Turning Area  
Crossing 
Wind 
Prob.  
Location A  20 m  0.8m/s  1.08 m 1.5L  1020m  4.6%  
Location B  17m  0.85m/s  0.81 m 1.25L  1260m 3.8%  
 
 
In addition, the Code for Design of Liquefied Natural Gas Port and Jetty [30] was 
referred to adjust the environmental input data for berthing process simulation. The code 
regulated berthing limited conditions as follows:  The maximum allowable wind speed 
should be 15 m/s; The transverse waves should not exceed 1.2 meters, while the 
threshold value of following waves should be 1.5 m; Visibility for navigating in the 
inbound channel should be greater than 1000 meters; The upper limit for transverse 
current speed is 0.5 m/s, while the following current speed should not exceed 1.0 m/s. 
 
4.3 LNG Transferring Process Simulation 
 
After the LNGC is safely getting alongside the LNG FSRU, the system moves to 
the last stage, LNG transferring from LNGC to FSRU.  
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4.3.1 Defined Scenarios 
Based on the previous research [32, 33, 34], it is a reasonable to simulate this 
event “LNG releasing on the water” by two scenarios: one is called maximum credible 
scenario (MCS), which is the most possible scenario for one year the LNG FSRU system 
may face; another one is called worst case scenario (WCS), which means the extremely 
dangerous situation for LNG FSRU system [35].   
To process the simulation by Safeti 7.2, several input parameters should be 
determined. For the two scenarios, the external environment factors for weather data 
input, wind, air temperature and relative humidity, can be obtained from the 
meteorological and hydrographic records of two locations.  
For maximum credible scenario, the input parameter “wind” was the prevailing 
wind for two locations. As shown in Figure 14, the wind rose map of location A shows 
the prevailing wind direction was north wind with the speed of 8 m/s; while the 
prevailing wind direction of location B is northeast wind with the speed of 6.7 m/s; the 
air temperature for MCS was the average temperature of one whole year, where 10.5 
degree centigrade for location A and 15.1℃ for location B; similarly, the humidity 
parameter was selected as the average humidity for a whole year, 69% for location A 
and 75% for location B.  
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Figure 14. Wind Rose Map of Location A (Adapted from [57]) 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Wind Direction Frequency Distribution (Adapted from [57]) 
 Average Speed (m/s) Max. Speed (m/s) Frequency (%) 
N 8.0 34.2 19.5 
NNE 5.6 20.0 2.8 
NE 3.7 17.0 1.2 
ENE 5.7 17.0 2.9 
E 4.8 15.0 4.9 
ESE 4.2 11.5 6.8 
SE 3.8 22.0 6.4 
SSE 4.2 12.0 6.8 
S 4.9 12.0 9.0 
SSW 5.7 13.0 3.8 
SW 5.5 14.0 4.5 
WSW 5.5 13.0 2.6 
W 5.5 17.0 4.0 
WNW 6.6 20.0 3.4 
NW 6.5 24.4 8.8 
NNW 7.5 33.8 5.8 
CALM   6.8 
 
 
For worst case scenario, the “wind” parameter was the most hazardous when the 
wind is blowing toward the pier since the fire may get more assets and people involved. 
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By considering the wind rose map of each location, the most hazardous wind directions 
were southeast and northeast for location A and location B, respectively and the worst 
wind speed is 15m/s because it is the maximum speed to still allow LNG transferring 
operation to process [30]. Since the air temperature may fluctuate day to day, the WCS 
air temperature was chosen as the highest monthly average one for a whole year, 15.1℃ 
for location A and 20.6℃ for location B. Similarly, the humidity parameter was 
determined as the highest monthly average humidity for a whole year, 83% for location 
A and 88% for location B.  
The release preconditions, hose loading capacity, leakage time and hole size, 
were determined as the main parameters to define the exact releasing volume of MCS 
and WCS. For WCS, the hose loading capacity was referred as the LNG FSRU’s 
maximum loading capacity and the accidental release time was determined as 20 
minutes to calculate the simulated release volume for the events as connection hose 
rupture and flange failure. As shown in table 5, the inner diameter of LNG loading hose 
and loading hose flange were 0.254 m and 0.41 m, respectively, so the hole size was 
determined as the total-damage scenario. For MCS, the hose capacity was determined as 
the 87% of the maximum loading capacity and the release time was the 10 minutes; the 
holes was determined as 0.2 m for connection flange failure and 0.12 m for connection 
hose rupture scenario. The input data for MCS and WCS simulation are listed in Table 
10. 
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Table 10. Input Data for Safeti Simulation Plans 
 Wind  Air 
Temperature  
Humidity  Pasquill 
Stability  
Release 
Time  
Hole Size 
Diameter 
Maximum 
Credible 
Scenario 
(MCS)  
Prevailing 
Wind (A; 8 
m/s, N; 
B:6.7m/s, 
NE)  
Yearly Average 
(A: 10.5℃; 
B:15.1℃)  
Yearly 
Average 
Humidity 
(A: 69%; B: 
75%) 
E 1167 m3  0.2m (Flange 
Failure)/0.12m 
(Hose 
Rupture)  
Worst 
Case 
Scenario 
(WCS)  
15m/s 
(A: SE; B: 
NE)  
Highest 
Monthly 
Average 
Temperature 
(A: 15.1℃; B: 
20.6℃)  
Highest 
Monthly 
Average 
Humidity 
(A: 83%; B: 
88%)  
Loc. A: 
C; 
Loc. B: 
D  
2667m3  0.41 m (Flange 
Failure)/0.254 
m (Hose 
Rupture)  
 
 
 
4.3.2 Simulation Results 
 
The runs were designed in 4 group comparisons with 8 simulations. Simulation 
plan 1, 2, 3 and 4 were taken for connection flange failure. Among these four simulation 
plans, simulation plan 1 and 2 took place in location A under scenario MCS and WCS, 
respectively; Simulation plan 3 and 4 took place in location B under scenario MCS and 
WCS. Meanwhile, simulation runs 5 to 8 were for connection hose rupture, and 
simulation plan 5 and 6 took place in location A under scenario MCS and WCS; 
Simulation plan 7 and 8 took place in location B under scenario MCS and WCS, 
respectively.  
Figure 15 shows the preliminary simulation outputs by Safeti 7.2 for two 
alternatives under the condition of “flange failure with worst case scenario” (simulation 
plan 2 and 4).  
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Figure 15. Simulation Outputs for Two Alternatives under WCS and Flange Failure 
 
 
 
From Figure 15, the left one is the simulated thermal radiation influence areas of 
location A and the right one is that of location B. The red circle is the high thermal 
radiation area with heat flux 37.5 kW/m2, the green one is the thermal radiation intensity 
of 12.5 kW/m2 and the blue circle is the range of thermal radiation intensity of 5kW/ m2. 
Meanwhile, other simulation plans were taken under different input data, and Table 11 
shows all simulated outcomes of eight simulation plans. The potential fatalities would be 
calculated based on the values of thermal radiation distance and flammability limits 
distance in the following chapter. 
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Table 11. Outcomes of Designed Simulation Plans 
 
Plan Location Scenario Dia. 
of 
Hole 
Size 
(mm) 
Est. 
Leakage 
Volume 
Fire 
Type 
Thermal Radiation Distance Flammability Limits 
Distance 
4kW/m2  12.5kW/m2  37.5kW/m2  UFL  LFL  0.5LFL  
1  A  MCS  200  1167  Flash     220  794  1590  
2  A  WCS  410  2667  Jet  1141  1022  976        
3  B  MCS  200  1167  Flash     194  771  1546  
4  B  WCS  410  2667  Jet  1128  1016  976       
5  A  MCS  120  1167  Flash     11  77  277  
6  A  WCS  254  2667  Pool  501  302  192      
7  B  MCS  120  1167  Flash     9  70  202  
8  B  WCS  254  2667  Pool  722  525  222     
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CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
After the completion of simulation runs for three processes, the utility value 
should be determined from bottom hierarchy to the top. Navigational process and 
berthing process, which were called maritime safety study in this research, adopted risk 
evaluation matrix to determine each utility value; while for chemical process safety part, 
LNG transferring process was determined by the potential loss of life (PLL) [36]. 
 
5.1 Evaluation Methodology for Maritime Safety Study 
 
In order to establish the relationship between expected utility value and risk level, 
five qualitative evaluation scales (favorable, acceptable, moderate, limited acceptable, 
and unacceptable) are converted to five utility ranges evenly. 90 experts were consulted 
to determine the evaluation standards for each attribute of navigational process and 
berthing process shown in Figure 10.  
To avoid subjectivity, 30 senior officers of deck department aboard ships, 30 
professional pilots and 30 professors from marine maneuvering major built up the expert 
judgment team for this research. Based on the opinions of the expert judgment team and 
previous studies on the marine maneuvering, every individual attribute was evaluated 
quantitatively based on the risk utility value (RUV) or risk tolerance index, which was 
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distributed evenly from 0 to 1 with the interval of 0.2. Furthermore, risk utility value 
range from 0.8 to 1.0 means the environment of this location is favorable to build LNG 
FSRU, while the value locating between 0.6 and 0.8 means it is acceptable for LNG 
FSRU; the range 0.4 to 0.6 means moderate environmental conditions for the system; 
limited acceptable when the RUV is in the range of 0.2 to 0.4; it is unacceptable when 
the utility value goes below 0.2 [40].The evaluation standards for adopted attributes of 
navigational and berthing process were established based on the questionnaires (see 
Appendix 1) collected from professors, pilots and senior officers onboard. 
 
5.1.1 Evaluation Standards for Risk Utility Value  
 
“Visibility”, as an example, was determined by the number of days under poor 
visibility (visible distance < 4000m) per year [29, 37]. Four risk utility values (0.8, 0.6, 
0.4 and 0.2) were given to experts to get their opinions on the risk standard of “visibility” 
to build LNG FSRU. From the collected data, Figure 10 showed the distributions of 
restricted visibility days per year where it is favorable/ acceptable/ moderate / limited 
acceptable/ unacceptable for LNG FSRU operations.  
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Figure 16. Data Analysis of Boundary Values of “Visibility” 
 
 
Since there were some outliers among these four graphs, the new distribution 
without outliers can be shown on the Figure 15. Therefore, the point value of these four 
risk utility values with 95% confidential interval can be (14.47, 15.64), (19.68, 20.70), 
(29.15, 30.22) and (39.77, 40.65) with the p value much smaller than 0.05, shown in 
Appendix 2. Therefore, the evaluation standard for “visibility” was shown on Table 12. 
 
 
 
 
Risk Utility Value = 0.8 Risk Utility Value = 0.6 
Risk Utility Value = 0.4 
Risk Utility Value = 0.2 
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Table 12. Evaluation Standard for “Visibility” 
 
  Utility 
Range 
Factors 
Favorable, 
(0.8,1] 
Acceptable, 
(0.6,0.8) 
Moderate, 
(0.4,0.6] 
Limited 
Acceptable, 
(0.2,0.4] 
Unacceptable, 
[0,0.2] 
Visibility  ＜15 15～20 20～30 30～40 ＞40 
 
 
The total evaluation standards based were displayed in the Table 13 by analyzing 
the collected data for all the attributes of navigational process and berthing process.  
 
Table 13. Evaluation Standards for Each Attribute of Maritime Safety Study 
 
       Utility       
Range 
Factors 
Favorable, 
(0.8,1] 
Acceptable, 
(0.6,0.8) 
Moderate, 
(0.4,0.6] 
Limited 
Acceptable, 
(0.2,0.4] 
Unacceptable, 
[0,0.2] 
Visibility (d/y) ＜15 15～20      20～30   30～40 ＞40 
Windy Days (d/y) ＜30 30～60      60～100   100～150 ＞150 
Following 
Current Prob.  
< 3% 3~6%      6~10%   10~15%            >15% 
Channel Width >900 650~900      450~650   300~450 < 300 
Channel 
Curvature 
<15° 15°~25°      25°~35°   35°~45° >45° 
UKC >15m 10~15m      5~10m   2~5m <2m 
Water Depth >25m 22~25m     18~22m   15~18m <15m 
Following 
Current 
<0.3m/s 0.3~0.6      0.6~0.8   0.8~1 >1m/s 
Wave Height ＜0.3m 0.3～0.6      0.6～1.0   1.0～1.2 ＞1.2m 
Berth Length >2.5L 2~2.5L      1.5~2L   1.2~1.5L <1.2L 
Turning Basin 
Area 
>1200m     1000~1200 m      800~1000 m   600~800 m <600m 
Cross Wind 
Prob. 
< 1.5% 1.5~3% 3~4.5%   4.5~6.5% >6.5% 
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5.1.2 Risk Utility Value Analysis  
 
To get the expected value of each attribute for both alternatives, the utility value 
for the bottom hierarchy should be calculated first. Ua(Collision) was taken as an 
example, the value of it should be calculated by attributes “visibility”, “windy days” and 
“following current probability”. Based on expert judgment records, the utility function 
for “visibility” can be obtained by the statistics software R. 
 Firstly, the total data were split into three parts, 45 data points for training data, 
10 data points for validation data set and 35 data points for testing data. From the output 
of plot command, one outlier (Vis=45, Risk=0.6) and one leverage (Vis=125, Risk=0.05) 
were identified, then the new data set were established without those two data points.  
Suppose the data points following linear regression, the regression function 
should be:  
Risk = β0+β1Vis+…+βnVisn                                                (23) 
Five regression functions were tried for “Visibility” by R, shown in Appendix 3 
(Figure 1~5). Table 14 showed all the summaries about these five regression models for 
“Risk ~ Visibility”.  
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Table 14. Summary of Five Possible Regression Functions 
 R Square 
Value 
Coefficients Comments 
Risk= 
β0+β1Vis 
0.77 β0 = 0.83 
β1 = -0.011 
The least R square value; The standard residual plot 
showed the linearity and heteroscedasticity were not 
good; The scale-location plot showed a curve with 
non-equally spreading residuals 
Risk= 
β0+β1In(Vis) 
0.93 β0 = 1.931 
β1 = -0.438 
The standard residual plot showed the linearity and 
heteroscedasticity were not good; The scale-location 
plot showed the residual spreading equally along the 
ranges of predictors; But the Cook’s distance line 
was a broken line. 
Risk= 
β0+β1Vis+ 
β2Vis2 
0.96 β0 = 1.251 
β1 = -0.035 
β2 = 2.56*10-4 
The standard residual plot showed the linearity and 
heteroscedasticity were good; The scale-location 
plot showed the residual spreading equally along the 
ranges of predictors; But the Cook’s distance line 
was close to a line with one point locating between 
0.5 and 1. 
Risk= 
β0+β1Vis+ 
β2Vis2 
+β3Vis3 
0.98 β0 = 1.464 
β1 = -0.055 
β2 = 7.49*10-4 
β3 = -3.44*10-
6 
 
See Figure 17. 
Risk= 
β0+β1Vis+ 
β2Vis2+β3Vis3 
+β4Vis4 
0.98 β0 = 1.362 
β1 = -0.041 
β2 =1.87*10-4  
β3 =5.34*10-6 
β4 =-4.59*10-8 
The largest R square value; P value ofβ2, β3 and β2 
were much larger than 0.05; The standard residual 
plot showed the linearity and heteroscedasticity were 
good; The scale-location plot showed the residual 
spreading equally along the ranges of predictors; But 
the Cook’s distance line was close to a line with one 
point locating close to 1. 
 
 
According to the column of “R-square value”, the last two functions were the 
best among all five models as per their good interpretation for existed data points. 
However, interpretation and prediction should be balanced to get an optimal model by 
the comprehensive performances, and Figure 17 showed the performance of the fourth 
function.  
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Figure 17. Data Testing Performance of Selected Model 
 
 
 
The standard residual plot of Figure 17 showed the linearity and 
heteroscedasticity were good; the normal quantile plot showed the data were normally 
distributed; the scale-location plot showed the residual spreading equally along the 
ranges of predictors; and the Cook’s distance line was close to a straight line without any 
leverage. 
Therefore, our model for “Visibility” is:  
Risk = Vis+I(Vis^2)+I(Vis^3)= 1.464-0.055Vis+ 7.49*10-4 Vis2 -3.44*10-6 Vis3     (24) 
Then the model was validated by applying K-fold cross validation (k=5), shown 
in Appendix 3 (Figure 6). Finally, the rest of the dataset were used to test the model. The 
mean value and standard deviation of the prediction were calculated to prove that the 
accuracy of our model was acceptable. 
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Therefore, by inputting the “Visibility” data into the model, the risk utility value 
for location A: Ua(V) = 0.5803 while the RUV for location B: Ub(V) = 0.3952. By the 
same process, the RUV of “windy days”, Ua(W) = 0.2321 and Ub(W) = 0.1991; the 
RUV of “Following Current Probability”, Ua(C) = 0.5218 and Ub(C) = 0.4281. 
 
5.1.3 Weight Value Determination 
  
The same methodology was applied to get the utility values of “windy days” and 
“following current Probability”. Then the AHP was adopted to calculate weight values 
of each attribute. By applying pairwise comparison, the weight evaluation matrix of 
“Collision” can be obtained as shown in Table 15. 
 
 
Table 15. Weight Evaluation Matrix of “Collision”   
Evaluation Index K1 K2 K3 
K1, Visibility 1 1.37 4.35 
K2, Windy Days 0.73 1 2.86 
K3, Following 
Current Prob. 
0.23 0.35 1 
 
  
By calculation, the maximum eigenvalue of evaluation matrix is λmax = 3.0018，
and the weight vector (eigenvector) can be obtained accordingly. After normalizing, the 
weight vector is  
6)3628,0.122(0.5146,0.=WA . Therefore, the consistency index is 
given as: 
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To measure the scale of consistency index reasonably， the Saaty’s average 
random consistency scale, RI, was introduced [7]. 
Five hundred comparison matrixes were randomly constructed, shown as 
50021 ,,, AAA  ，thus 500 eigenvaule can be calculated as 50021 ,,, CICICI  . The value 
of RI was calculated by the below formula. 
1
500
500
50021
50021






n
n
CICICI
RI
 

                                   (26)                              
The Saaty’s average random consistency scale value [7], RI, is shown in Table 
16. 
 
 
 
Table 16. Average Random Consistency Scale Value by Saaty, 1990 [7] 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RI 0 0 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 
 
 
From the above table, the consistency rate is shown below. 
1.000155.0
58.0
0009.0
＜
RI
CI
CR                                                              (27) 
The output shows a satisfied consistency, thus the weight vector passed the 
consistency test. The weight vector for the attribute hierarchy of “Collision” is: 
6)3628,0.122(0.5146,0.)K,K,(K=W 321A                                 (28) 
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Therefore, the RUV for “Collision”, 
Ua(Collision) =  k1 ∗ Ua(V) +  k2 ∗ Ua(W) + k3 ∗ Ua(C) = 0.5146 ∗ 0.5803 +
0.3628 ∗ 0.2321 + 0.1226 ∗ 0.5218 = 0.4468                        (29) 
Ub(Collision) =  k1 ∗ Ub(V) +  k2 ∗ Ub(W) + k3 ∗ Ub(C) = 0.5146 ∗ 0.3952 +
0.3628 ∗ 0.1991 + 0.1226 ∗ 0.4281 = 0.3281                                  (30) 
Ua(Grouding) = k1 ∗ Ua(CW) + k2 ∗ Ua(CC) +  k3 ∗ Ua(UKC) = 0.4150 ∗ 0.8513 +
0.2312 ∗ 0.4417 + 0.3538 ∗ 0.6616 = 0.6895                           (31) 
Ub(Grouding) = k1 ∗ Ub(CW) + k2 ∗ Ub(CC) +  k3 ∗ Ub(UKC) = 0.4150 ∗ 0.6731 +
0.2312 ∗ 0.5709 + 0.3538 ∗ 0.4013 = 0.5533                         (32) 
According to previous incident records in Table 1, the ration of LNGC collision 
probability and LNGC grounding probability were 442/293. The weight value can be 
normalized as K(Collision) = 0.6013 and K(Grounding) = 0.3987.  
The RUV of navigational process for location A is: 
Ua(NP) = k(Collision) ∗ Ua(Collision) + k(Grounding) ∗ Ua(Grounding) =
0.6013 ∗ 0.4468 + 0.3987 ∗ 0.6895 = 0.5436                                (33) 
The RUV of navigational process for location B is: 
Ub(NP) = k(Collision) ∗ Ub(Collision) + k(Grounding) ∗ Ub(Grounding) =
  0.6013 ∗ 0.3281 + 0.3987 ∗ 0.5533 = 0.4179                                   (34) 
For the berthing process, the weight value ratio of two identified hazards, 
“Contacting with the nearest obstruction”, K(Obstruction) and the “Contacting with 
LNG FSRU”, K(FSRU), was supposed as 7/13 due to the potential consequences. The 
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similar theory was applied to calculate the RUV of berthing process for two locations 
[40]. 
Ua(BP) = k(Obstruction) ∗ Ua(Obstruction) + k(FSRU) ∗ Ua(FSRU) = 0.2680 ∗
0.3709 + 0.7380 ∗ 0.4620 = 0.4404                                                 (35)                               
Ub(BP) = k(Obstruction) ∗ Ub(Obstruction) + k(FSRU) ∗ Ub(FSRU) = 0.2680 ∗
0.3825 + 0.7380 ∗ 0.5100 = 0.4789                                                 (36) 
5.2 Evaluation Methodology for Chemical Process Safety Study 
 
For LNG transferring process, the index of potential loss of life (PLL) was 
applied to evaluate the risk level of each alternative and the utility value can be 
determined by the potential facilities of MCS and WCS [41]. 
To obtain the PLL value of jet fire and pool fire, the thermal radiation distance 
[43], shown in Table 12, was employed to determine the possible fatality in the 
vulnerable areas.  
Referred from Sudheer, S., et al., 2013 and Horn, et al., 2017, the consequences 
of thermal heat flux on human bodies were illustrated in Table 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
 
 
Table 17. Thermal Radiation Intensity Impacts on Human Body (Adapted from [44] [45]) 
Heat Flux 
(kW/m2) 
Impacts on one human body 
1.4 Harmless for human body  
2.1 Minimum required to cause pain after 1 minute 
4.0 Pain after 20-second exposure, cause first degree burns 
7.0 Maximum tolerable for firefighters with completed covered 
protective clothes 
12.5 Extreme pain within 20-second exposure; Lethality if escape not 
possible 
25.0 Mechanical integrity of insulated thin steel can be lost 
37.5 Collapse of mechanical structures; Instantaneous lethality 
 
 
 
 To establish the relationship between fatality and thermal radiation intensity, the 
theory of probit functions should be presented. A Thermal Dose Unit (TDU) defined in 
equation 5 is a unit to measure exposure to thermal radiation [52].  
V = I4/3t                                                         (37) 
Where 
-I: the intensity of thermal radiation 
-t: the exposure time 
Then the equation 6 was built to establish relationship between probit function Y 
and the thermal dose V.  
Y = a + bInV                                                            (38) 
Where 
-a, -b: the coefficients of probit function 
-V: the thermal dose 
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Typically, the probit function for was firstly proposed by Eisenberg in 1975 
based on nuclear explosion data [46]. Then Tsao and Perry modified Eisenberg’s model 
by considering infrared radiation and Lees presented his model by validating on pig skin 
experiments [47]. By taking into account the protection effects of clothes, TNO Green 
Book showed an advanced model to be widely applied to determine the lethality.  
 
 
Table 18. Summary of Probit Function Models 
Model a b Key Publications 
Eisenberg’s 
Model 
-14.9 2.56 [46], [50] 
 
Tsao & 
Perry’s Model 
-12.8 2.56 [47], [51] 
Lees’s Model 
 
-10.69 1.99 [48], [51] 
TNO Model -13.65 2.56 [49], [51] 
 
 
 
 
The vulnerable building for two alternatives should be determined to calculate 
PPL value. Three ranges (500-meter circle, 1000-meter circle and 1500-meter circle) 
were drawn in Figure 18 to show potential damaged buildings for location A.  
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Figure 18. Vulnerable Areas for Location A under 500m Circle, 1000m Circle and 1500m Circle  
 
 
 
 
For location A: In the range of 500-meter radius area (the left side figure in 
Figure 20), there are one working station and three LNG tanks; the number of workers in 
this area is assumed as 69. In the range of 1000-meter radius area (the middle one in Fig. 
20), there are one residential area with 500 people, one berth  for importing ore, one 
office building for ore company and two more working stations, assuming the total 
number of people involved is 694. In the range of 1500 meters, there are one police 
station, four more working stations, one more ore-ship berth, 3 storage warehouses and 
15 storage tanks and one more grocery retailer shop; the maximum number of involved 
people for WCS in this area is assumed as 849, and the number of involved personnel for 
MCS was assumed as 70% of the maximum number. 
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Figure 19. Vulnerable Areas for Location B under 500m Circle, 1000m Circle and 1500m Circle  
 
 
 
Figure 19 shows the vulnerable areas (marked with yellow circles) with the 
radius of 500 meters (left side figure), 1000 meters (middle one) and 1500 meters (right 
side figure) for location B. The coast line of Qidong port area was surrounded by 
shallow shoals. Therefore, two pipeline bridges were built to extend 1.5 km to the sea to 
allow large-scale ships to safely get alongside Qidong port. As a result of the two 
bridges, less vulnerable buildings were involved in the influential areas. For 500-meter 
radius area, the only influential building is one pipeline bridge except the LNG FSRU 
system; for 1000-meter radius area, there are one turning basin, one bulk-carrier berth 
and two pipeline bridges; besides that, there is one more crude oil berth in the 1500-
meter radius of proposed LNG FSRU system. Suppose three people working for every 
500 meters on the pipeline bridges, four tug boats with total 52 workers on board in 
turning basin, 30 people in LNG carrier and crude oil tanker and 25 in bulk carrier, and 
10 people for loading/unloading operations for each vessel. So, the maximum numbers 
of people involved for WCS in the three vulnerable areas were estimated as 38, 124 and 
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164, respectively; also, the number of involved personnel for MCS was assumed as 70% 
of the maximum values. 
On the other hand, the PLL of flash fire was calculated by the values of LFL and 
0.5 LFL. The possibility of fatality was assumed 100% in Zone 1, a defined zone 
between UFL contour and LFL contour; and 50% for Zone 2, defined between LFL 
contour and 0.5LFL contour [46].  
Referred by DNVGL MPACT Model [53], the heat flux value “4kW/m2” could 
lead to 1% possible fatality, while the value of “12.5 kW/m2” was 50% and the value of 
“37.5 kW/m2” was 100%. As for the range between these three point values, the lethality 
ellipse, see Figure 19, was employed to calculate the PLL in this study. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Defined Heat Flux Impact Area 
 
 
 
From the above figure, three point values were shown as the barrier value of 
three areas. The Red Zone, which was defined as the most vulnerable area with the heat 
flux value larger than 37.5 km/m2, while the Blue Zone was the area with that value 
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between 12.5 and 37.5; the Green Zone was the area with the heat flux value between 4 
and 12.5. The average possibility of fatality (APF) was set as 1.0 in the red area, while 
the APF of blue area was 0.75 and that of the green area was 0.255 [53]. 
According to the Table 10, the PLLs of location A and location B under MCS 
and WCS were calculated shown in below table. 
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Table 19. Summary of PLL for Simulation Runs 
Plan Loc. Scenario Fire 
Type 
Involved Vulnerable Buildings Potential Involved 
Personnel 
PLL Thermal Radiation Distance Flammability Limits 
Distance 
 4kW/m2  12.5kW/m2  37.5kW/m2  UFL  LFL  0.5LFL  
1  A  MCS  Flash  Working stations (7), LNG tanks (3), residential 
area (1), LNG FSRU system (1), berth (2), office 
building (1), warehouses (3), storage tanks (15), 
grocery shop (1), police station (1) 
Zone 1:301; 
Zone 2: 76 
339    220  794  1590  
2  A  WCS  Jet  Working stations (3), LNG tanks (3), residential 
area (1), berth (1), LNG FSRU system (1), office 
building (1) 
Red Zone: 694; 
Blue Zone: 10; 
Green Zone: 15 
706 1141  1022  976        
3  B  MCS  Flash  LNG FSRU system (1), berth (2), pipeline 
bridge (2), turning basin (1) 
Zone 1:78; 
Zone 2: 38 
97    194  771  1546  
4  B  WCS  Jet  LNG FSRU system (1), berth (1), pipeline 
bridge (2), turning basin (1) 
Red Zone: 124; 
Blue Zone: 15; 
Green Zone: 25 
142  1128  1016  976       
5  A  MCS  Flash  Working stations (1), LNG tanks (1), LNG 
FSRU system (1) 
Zone 1:14; 
Zone 2: 28 
28    11  77  277  
6  A  WCS  Pool  Working stations (1), LNG tanks (3), LNG 
FSRU system (1) 
Red Zone: 40; 
Blue Zone: 20; 
Green Zone: 9 
58  501  302  192      
7  B  MCS  Flash  LNG FSRU system (1), pipeline bridge (1) Zone 1:14; 
Zone 2: 10 
19    9  70  202  
8  B  WCS  Pool  LNG FSRU system (1), berth (1), pipeline 
bridge (2), turning basin (1) 
Red Zone: 32; 
Blue Zone: 17; 
Green Zone: 35  
54  722  525  222     
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The probability 10-5 per year was usually defined as the boundary of the 
individual risk of fatality for marine transfer operation [50]. This frequency was assumed 
as the total frequency of Event A “connection flange failure” and Event B “connection 
hose failure”, and the Pr(A) was assumed as 2.5 * 10-6, then Pr(B) equals to 7.5*10-6. 
The frequency of each scenario can be obtained from the event tree analysis (see 
Appendix 4), so the value of risk can be calculated by PLL timing frequency. 
Under the Maximum Credible Scenario,  
 Ra(MCS) = Ra(Event A)+ Ra(Event B) = 1.047*10-4 deaths per year                (39) 
 Rb(MCS) = Rb(Event A)+ Rb(Event B) = 3.811*10-5 deaths per year               (40) 
For Worst Case Scenario,  
 Ra(WCS) = Ra(Event A)+ Ra(Event B) = 1.809*10-4 deaths per year               (41) 
 Rb(WCS) = Rb(Event A)+ Rb(Event B) = 3.955*10-5 deaths per year               (42) 
Based on the ALARP boundaries defined by International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), the risk utility scale was built accordingly, see Table 20. 
 
 
Table 20. Evaluation Scale for “PLL per Year” 
 
  Utility 
Range 
Factors 
Favorable, 
(0.8,1] 
Acceptable, 
(0.6,0.8) 
Moderate, 
(0.4,0.6] 
Limited 
Acceptable, 
(0.2,0.4] 
Unacceptable, 
[0,0.2] 
PLL per 
year 
<10-6 10-5~10-6 10-4~10-5 10-3~10-4 >10-3 
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Therefore, the risk value was converted to utility value on the basis of linear 
relation between utility range and PLL value. For MCS, the weight values of “Event A” 
and “Event B” were 0.25, 0.75, respectively. For “WCS”, the weight values of “Event A” 
and “Event B” were 0.75 and 0.25. Then the utility values for location A and location B 
under MCS condition are:  
      Ua(MCS)= k1U(Event A)+k2U(Event B) = 0.25*0.4358+0.75*0.5760 = 0.5410    (43) 
      Ub(MCS)= k1U(Event A)+k2U(Event B) = 0.25*0.5689+0.75*0.5909 = 0.5854    (44) 
For WCS, the utility values of two locations are: 
Ua(WCS) = k1U(Event A)+k2U(Event B) = 0.75*0.3830 + 0.25*0.7256 = 0.4687   (45) 
Ub(WCS) = k1U(Event A)+k2U(Event B) = 0.75*0.5433+0.25*0.7322 = 0.5905    (46) 
 
5.3 Total Utility Value Calculation 
 
From Table 1, the probabilities of collision, grounding, contact, fire & explosion 
and loading/unloading events were converted to the ratio to calculate the weight value of 
navigational process, berthing process and LNG transferring process. Therefore, k(NP) = 
0.7541; k(BP) = 0.1498; k(TP) = 0.0961. 
The total utility value for location A under MCS is:  
                             Ua = k1Ua(NP) + k2Ua(BP) + k3Ua(TP) = 0.5225                               (47) 
            The total utility value for location A under MCS is:  
                             Ub = k1Ub(NP) + k2Ub(BP) + k3Ub(TP) = 0.4431                              (48) 
            Under WCS, Ua’= 0.5212; Ub’= 0.4436.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
 
           In summary, the total utility value showed location A was a more reliable place to 
build the LNG FSRU system. Generally, the two values both located in the utility range 
(0.4, 0.6), reckoned as “Moderate”. Specifically, some further conclusions can be 
achieved by different processes.  
For navigational process, location A outperformed location on both “collision” 
and “grounding”, proving the navigation environment of location A was more reliable 
for LNG carriers than that of location B; for berthing process, location B had a higher 
overall score, showing it was less risky for identified contacting with berthing 
obstructions and LNG FSRU. For LNG transferring process, two events and two 
scenarios were identified for LNG accidental release, location B performed better than 
location A on both of two events as it separated the populated areas with two pipeline 
bridges so that less vulnerable buildings were involved in the vicinity of location B. 
Although location B outperformed location A in two of three processes, location A still 
had a higher score in the total utility value since the weight value for navigational 
process was much larger than other two processes based on the recorded incidents. 
To mitigate the risk into an acceptable level, some measures may be taken into 
account. For navigational process, the security zones, both static and dynamic zones, 
should be set up for large scale LNG carriers, such as Q-Flex and Q-Max, to avoid other 
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traffic interfering LNGC, and this measure can reduce the occurrence of collision in 
inbound channels significantly [38, 54]; the recommended routes should be always top 
priority to navigate since the UKC can meet the requirement of safe sailing or large draft 
vessels may ride on the tide to pass the shallow areas. For berthing process, enough 
turning basin, especially enough berthing width should be ensured to lower the risk of 
contact with FSRU or other navigational hazards, and the transverse speed of the LNGC 
should be observed frequently when it is approaching the LNG FSRU. For LNG 
transferring process, the emergency plan and procedures should be implemented before 
the operation begins; the responsible officers should be assigned to ensure every possible 
contingency could follow an organized procedure; evacuation plans and extreme 
situation trainings were the key factors to succeed in potential disasters.  
This research serves as a quantitative way to evaluate the three consecutive 
processes for one engineering system, LNG FSRU system. It is a trail to apply both 
nautical study and chemical process safety knowledge on near shore industry. In the 
evaluation process, the objective environmental factors were deeply compared via 
simulation and statistical software. However, human factors and other subjective 
uncertainties are necessary to consider under different hydrographic and meteorological 
conditions for the LNG FSRU system. From the perspective of offshore safety, this data-
driven direction would be a right way to make safety the second nature. To accomplish 
this goal step by step, more data sources should be added to monitor operations in 
different dimensions and more data analytic methodologies should be applied to build a 
clearer relationship between raw data and safety performances.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Sample Questionnaire for Risk Utility Value of LNG FSRU 
Evaluation Attributes 
 
 
Which department are you in? 
1. Maritime Institutes 
2. Pilot Station 
3. Shipping Companies 
How many years have you worked/researched for LNG carriers? 
1. Less than 5years 
2. 5 to 8 years 
3. More than 8 years 
 
The evaluation scale was set between 0 and 1, and five evaluation ranges were 
determined with the even interval of 0.2 based on the risk level for LNG FSRU system, 
see table below.  
Table. 1-1 Quantitative Value for Risk Qualitative Evaluation 
Favorable Acceptable Moderate Limited 
Acceptable 
Unacceptable 
[0.8,1] [0.6,0.8) [0.4,0.6) [0.2,0.4) [0,0.2) 
 
Risk utility value range from 0.8 to 1.0 means the environment of this location is favorable to build LNG FSRU, while the value 
locating between 0.6 and 0.8 means it is acceptable for LNG FSRU; the range 0.4 to 0.6 means moderate environmental conditions 
for the system; limited acceptable when the risk utility value is in the range of 0.2 to 0.4. 
 
Risk Evaluation for “Visibility”  
Visibility value for LNG carrier is defined as the number of days under poor visibility 
(visible distance < 4000m) per year. Now please fill the blanks about the relevant values. 
 
Which value do you think is the most appropriate one when risk utility value of 
“Visibility” is set as 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8, respectively? Please fill the blanks. 
 
Table. 1-2 “Visibility” Evaluation Table 
 Risk Utility 
Value= 0.2 
Risk Utility 
Value= 0.4 
Risk Utility 
Value= 0.6 
Risk Utility 
Value= 0.8 
Restricted 
Visibility Days 
per Year 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
   Figure 2-1. Outputs of Confidential Interval of “Visibility” Threshold 
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APPENDIX 3 
            
 
 
               Figure 3-1. For “Risk= β0+β1Vis”                              Figure 3-2. For “Risk= β0+β1In(Vis)” 
 
 
 
    Figure 3-3. For “Risk= β0+β1Vis+ β2Vis2”               Figure 3-4. For “Risk= β0+β1Vis+ β2Vis2 +β3Vis3” 
 
 
   
  Figure 3-5. Risk= β0+β1Vis+ β2Vis2+β3Vis3 +β4Vis4              Figure 3-6. K-fold Cross Validation  
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Event Tree for Connection Flange Failure 
Note: UVCE stands for Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion, which was neglected in this research due to its tiny possibility. 
 
Plan 1, Ra(Flash Fire) = Pr1*PLL = 2.475*10-7*339 = 0.839*10-4 deaths per year 
Plan 2, Ra(Jet Fire) = Pr2*PLL = 2.5*10-8*706 = 1.765*10-4 deaths per year 
Plan 3, Rb(Flash Fire) = Pr3*PLL = 2.475*10-7*97 = 0.240*10-4 deaths per year 
Plan 4, Rb(Jet Fire) = Pr4*PLL = 2.5*10-8*142 = 0.355*10-4 deaths per year 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Event Tree for Connection Hose Rupture 
 
Plan 5, Ra(Flash Fire) = Pr5*PLL = 7.424*10-7*28 = 2.079*10-5 deaths per year 
Plan 6, Ra(Jet Fire) = Pr6*PLL = 7.5*10-8*58 = 0.435*10-5 deaths per year 
Plan 7, Rb(Flash Fire) = Pr7*PLL = 7.424*10-7*19 = 1.411*10-5 deaths per year 
Plan 8, Rb(Jet Fire) = Pr8*PLL = 7.5*10-8*54 = 0.405*10-5 deaths per year 
